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Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical for TLS 1.3 after all?

Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org> Thu, 03 December 2015 16:44 UTC

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Date: Thu, 03 Dec 2015 17:44:04 +0100
From: Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Encrypting record headers: practical for TLS 1.3 after all?
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Errata:

Aaron Zauner wrote:
> BTW, I played with SNI DoS a few months back (not too much though as it
> wasn't worth a paper), seems not to be as bad as it used to be because
> implementations nowadays have at least some counter-measures.

Was supposed to say 'renegotiation DoS' I've looked at SNI as well in
this context.

Aaron

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