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From: Yoav Nir <ynir@checkpoint.com>
To: "<mrex@sap.com>" <mrex@sap.com>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] Safe ECC usage
Thread-Index: AQHOus0om0uHYDyqy0CSy5O2MDQzFJncJGEAgAKSogCAAGtCAA==
Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2013 05:14:09 +0000
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>, Kyle Hamilton <aerowolf@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Safe ECC usage
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On Oct 1, 2013, at 1:50 AM, Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

>=20
> I currently do not see any benefit from using EC for digital signatures,

Other than certificate size and the speed of making those calculations?  Re=
ally, try "openssl speed rsa2048 ecdsap256" on any Linux or Mac machine.

> but instead a huge amount of code, complexity and IPR issues (did you
> look at the CertiCom idea how to charge?).

Yes, I have: "If the standard is adopted, Patent Holder will not assert any=
 claims of any patents owned or controlled by the Patent Holder against any=
 party for making, using, selling importing or offering for sale a product =
that implements the Standard=85" (weird capitalization theirs, not mine)

Also, there's RFC 6090 on how you can do all the ECC operations with 1994 t=
echnology.

Also, public CAs, a notoriously careful bunch, have started issuing ECC cer=
ts, all browsers have ECC ciphersuites as does OpenSSL and others. Clearly =
the market is not afraid of the IPR issue.

> What I believe would be more attractive is an alternative to rfc4492
> for ECDHE_RSA based on curve25519 (and _just_ curve25519),

IANAL and neither are you. What makes you think that the IPR issues apply t=
o P-256 more than they do to Curve25519?

> i.e.
> a small number of new cipher suites and an additional ClientKeyExchange
> and ServerKeyExchange variant specifically tailord for curve25519, so
> that there are real benefits to a full-blown and generic rfc4492 TLS EC
> crypto.

ECDHE_RSA is slower than plain RSA. ECDHE_ECDSA is faster. Once you've dipp=
ed your toe in the ECC pool, there's no reason not to have it in the signat=
ure as well.

Yoav

