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Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension

Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> Thu, 05 April 2018 02:23 UTC

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From: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Wed, 04 Apr 2018 19:22:38 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension
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On Wed, Apr 4, 2018 at 7:15 PM, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
wrote:

>
>
> > On Apr 4, 2018, at 10:07 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> >
> > Given what we've learned about pinning (it is being removed from
> > browsers), this seems like a bad plan to me.
>
> Question, are you thinking of HPKP or STS?  HPKP pins rather volatile
> data, and is too fragile to be used (something I would have predicted
> without even running the experiment).  STS and this proposal pin a
> capability:
>
>         * STS:  I can be relied on to support TLS
>         * option (B): I can be relied on to support the TLS extension
>           for the specified itme (or not when the TTL is 0).
>

I don't think that this comparison is particularly apt.The representation
in HSTS
is simply "I support HSTS". The representation in HPKP is "I will use
either consistent
keying material *or* a consistent set of CAs". The representation here is
"I will
continue to have DNSSEC-signed DANE records". That is a significantly more
risky
proposition than continuing to support TLS (and I'm ignoring the risk of
hijacking
attacks that people were concerned with with HPKP), and so this seems rather
more like HPKP to me.

-Ekr




> --
>         Viktor.
>
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