Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 - Support for compression to be removed

[Colm MacCárthaigh <[e-mail]>]

I think there is a compression extension for NNTP:

http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-murchison-nntp-compress-01.html

it doesn't seem too hard. My 2c: even if this were not the case, optimizing
NNTP in a backwards compatible way does seem like a more important goal
than making transport security as secure as possible by default.


On Tue, Sep 22, 2015 at 12:44 PM, Yoav Nir <[e-mail]> wrote:

>
> > On Sep 22, 2015, at 9:40 PM, Salz, Rich <[e-mail]> wrote:
> >
> > The security community thinks that compression is risky, error-prone,
> and that a security/auth layer is the wrong place to put it.
> >
> > So far, the only counter-argument has been "if TLS 1.2 has a flaw, I
> want to move to TLS 1.3 without losing data compression."
> >
> > Is this accurate?
>
> I think the other counter-argument is that modifying NNTP to have a
> compression feature is hard, whereas updating the TLS library is something
> that implementations are likely to do.
>
> I have to wonder if it’s worth it. In the last decade bandwidth has
> increased and prices for networking have gone down much faster than CPU
> speeds. 10 years ago having 1 Mbps at home was  the highest-end broadband
> you could get. Now you routinely get 100x that. CPU has increased, but
> nowhere near that. This makes compression less desirable, to the point that
> people did not complain much when browser vendors removed compression
> following the CRIME attacks. True, the rise of mobile brought back limited
> bandwidth, but is this really an issue?
>
> Yoav
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-- 
Colm