Re: [TLS] Record layer corner cases

>> You argue that a TLS receiver should go out of its way to
>> build a second, longer path that contains the root certificate:
>>
>>    2) TA -> Root -> CA -> EE
> 
> Correct.  SSLv3 (and probably TLS as well) supports only a straight
> forward certification path, and if the local trust anchor happens
> to be the rootCA cert, then I think it is correct to check that
> rootCA cert during path validation in case the peer sends it.

My certificate store (which contains all the trusted certificates)
is indexed based on the DER encoding of the certificates, so if a
server includes a root certificate in its certification path, it
is easily determined to be a trust anchor.  So in my case TA ==
Root and you are left with TA -> CA -> EE.

However, this discussion pointed out that I was checking the
expiration date of the trust anchor, which apparently is not the
right thing to do, so I just eliminated that check.

Mike

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