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Re: [TLS] Limiting replay time frame of 0-RTT data

Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com> Mon, 14 March 2016 21:16 UTC

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Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2016 17:16:56 -0400
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From: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Limiting replay time frame of 0-RTT data
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>> From the browser side of things, 0-RTT is a solution to a very real
>> problem. We are excited about TLS 1.3 supporting 0-RTT (or 0-RTT resumption)
>> and converting QUIC to use the TLS 1.3 handshake as a result.
>
> ...
> TCP in the works? (does TCPCT work on the client side?). Do you have any
> human perception data; to people even notice the 3% at this point? (loading
> google seems remarkably fast!).  There's a very strong temptation to bias
> for what's easy to measure here.

We also lack statistics on the other costs associated with security
failures. The best I can tell, we have no idea of the impact if its
not in US Financial.

I wrote to the United Nations and Human Rights Watch a while back, and
they don't appear to collect statistics on human rights violations
after incidents like Diginotar.

I can't help but wonder how many folks would agree to controls like
Public Key Pinning with Overrides or 0-RTT if their well being and
their family's well being were at stake.

Jeff

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