Re: [TLS] Quest for Unified Solution to TLS Renegotiation

I support this.

I'm not sure whether the "magic" cipher suite MUST be present.
I think both approaches are acceptable but it feels like having it always
present may however offer better consistency after all and lead to simpler
test cases.

/Stefan

On 09-11-25 11:05 PM, "Martin Rex" <mrex@sap.com> wrote:

> Michael D'Errico wrote:
>> 
>> I think that it would be good to find a unified solution that
>> everybody is happy with, and believe that this may be it:
>> 
>> 
>>    1) Client-to-Server signalling can be done in either of
>>       two ways:
>> 
>>       A) an empty Secure_Renegotiation (SR) extension, or
>>       B) a "magic" cipher suite
>> 
>>    2) Server-to-Client signal is always an empty SR extension
>> 
>>    3) Incorporate previous verify_data into Finished calc.
>> 
>> 
>> The particulars:
>> 
>> A client that currently sends any other extensions MUST also
>> send the empty SR extension.
>> 
>> A client that currently does not send any extensions MAY send
>> the empty SR extension, or MAY send the magic cipher suite.
> 
> 
> A client MUST send the magic cipher suite.  A client that sends
> any TLS extension SHOULD send the the emtpy SR extension as well.
> 
> The server MUST check for the presence of the magic ciphersuite
> and MUST use secure renegotiation when present.  The server
> SHOULD NOT complain of absence of SR extension when the
> magic ciphersuite is present.
> 
> 
> -Martin
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