Re: [TLS] About encrypting SNI

[Nico Williams <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 8:53 AM, Tom Ritter <[e-mail]> wrote:
> ....But... There once was a thing called DNSSEC Stapled Certs
> (https://www.imperialviolet.org/2011/06/16/dnssecchrome.html) where a
> SSL certificate had a chain of DNSSEC signatures in it, validating it
> via DANE (or at that time, a DANE-like mechanism.)  It violates a

I've been thinking of this for a while...

> layering principal that people hold dearly, shoving DNS information in
> other corners it shouldn't be.  But I think it would be necessary for
> the wildcard approach to be reliable for clients like browsers.

Layers aren't pure though.  Some things show through the various
layers' interfaces, sometimes several layers through.

For example, many apps have to deal with all of DNS and TCP/IP, with
IP addresses and TCP port numbers used together in socket APIs.  It
might have been a lot better if the sockets APIs had deal with
hostnames from the start, but here we are.  Abstractions are leaky.

Now in this case I think saving a client a number of DNSSEC lookups
could be convenient.  We should -of course- make sure that this works
out securely -- we don't want to end up with a cache poisoning attack
here.

Nico
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