Re: [TLS] RFC-4366-bis and the unrecognized_name(112) alert

[Michael D'Errico <[e-mail]>]

Martin Rex wrote:
> 
> I actually fail to see the exact purpose of a warning-level alert
> "unrecognized_name".  The client is supposed to perform the server endpoint
> identification in any case, and that warning should not affect the
> outcome of that process at all.

I feel like I'm "guilty until proven innocent" on this one.

Have you ever connected to a secure site only to have the HTML contain a
warning that inadequate security was established?  This used to happen
if you connected to www.paypal.com with DES3 (but now it is just closing
the connection).  The purpose of that behavior was to give the end user
more diagnostic information than they get when the connection is merely
dropped after sending a fatal handshake_failure alert.

It would help if a no_common_ciphers alert was added to TLS.  That alert
would be sent when the server doesn't support any of the client's
proposed cipher suites.  It could also be used at the warning level in
the case of paypal's former behavior.  The handshake would complete
(after sending the warning) and then the server application would display
its error message in the HTML sent to the client.  The client's low-level
TLS code could be interrogated as to whether anything strange occurred
and it would be able to provide an answer.

The unrecognized_name warning alert can provide similar information to a
client application.  If something goes wrong and the client application
is looking for a reason why, it can ask the TLS layer if anything strange
happened.  If this warning alert was received, that information might
help the client diagnose the problem and determine what corrective action
to take.

However I disagree with your wording:

    A client that receives a warning-level "unrecognized_name" alert
    SHOULD ignore this alert and continue the TLS handshake.  The purpose
    of a warning-level "unrecognized_name" is for diagnostic purposes,
    if anything.

Clearly you don't see much use for this alert, but you should not impose
that bias on others.  It is up to the application to decide what to do
with the facilities provided by the TLS protocol.

Mike