IETF Logo Mail Archive

Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension

Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> Thu, 05 April 2018 02:39 UTC

Return-Path: <rlb@ipv.sx>
X-Original-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: tls@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 94A6E129BBF for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 4 Apr 2018 19:39:56 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.898
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.898 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=ipv-sx.20150623.gappssmtp.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id DIOluuCiSO41 for <tls@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 4 Apr 2018 19:39:54 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-ot0-x22d.google.com (mail-ot0-x22d.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4003:c0f::22d]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BFDE212426E for <tls@ietf.org>; Wed, 4 Apr 2018 19:39:54 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-ot0-x22d.google.com with SMTP id m22-v6so25605920otf.10 for <tls@ietf.org>; Wed, 04 Apr 2018 19:39:54 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ipv-sx.20150623.gappssmtp.com; s=20150623; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to; bh=CYoGMMAx0rvc440oph2krUZCYwKrMFtWwLJtIta/AUs=; b=xcK2EJXbSzhQvGBucNiCAzZAxJCCOTC3NqEfQHakYiIrlBoAjHHzF24dxwidPrNs7J X+xlQPx4vECGCwM3L/oOxs5aKZr0/VF7ORFwJSEuA0Q+214wHRPz+K5oVdcFcFOkBUQe /oidzihQ5yyu5Cse+mnD7PetqIzEuaeG3SYtGps83EpHqUeZ0GaZt9/Yxc1cIKL44Hy6 ShqpDJ71+7rbwCRSJKmx2PmSl/KlTvChSIlBI4XgkLTZwmJb9wq3fH7YOIR6V7J+V4EI 7UBEcrF74tbD06h9sHEGKhD3Il773+w3niLgirydHeu+WitlCwLMUCe2MLzM9phmXO8B PFUw==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to; bh=CYoGMMAx0rvc440oph2krUZCYwKrMFtWwLJtIta/AUs=; b=hry+5YH+JgLY/+Tdtmxf2+QHTqlprJFaGUqHUtqAaJbETgpdO72rXlIF1idFFr7cIl lD3wV/ogduifGm5CW3zrFm3fldykMXM+LBVD84BYPz24xAp5tbS1RmHqf/z/lzzWzhTX i5mqVp3K/8vS9Lrz5iBFDyLU1tLd/+0VsbC6mEz+7I45wGD+2FJkTcSd6iJXcGPry2xo 6LzfDC1/Au3RDVHpCBlojYDW6IqOy7O1NljpHk705hPW03vz5FjgBW7y4Hlcd+Wty/zw mb1+X9qfbmLnsdzPOZhAzJ6KM6EoVr6BFPDR9npTjXiTGLqxCFUOGc8KIxuTtz46HW9Z E/MA==
X-Gm-Message-State: ALQs6tDhoINwAWzn2psHRKKwwga4i6n84kYQejuI0gCpNBZXGGZrqWxV lZcp1hoB74yh44e7NRRNzoz2HgW5YEgfA0Cy+mAQeg==
X-Google-Smtp-Source: AIpwx4/zcanwMGfIj/Q0PJp6xCMLMNGHFxbaf1K5oPRfrR3+N8V5LfK1j9EOMpNWCHlH2/0wLRyGe5awmnsBcJ+mPmk=
X-Received: by 2002:a9d:305a:: with SMTP id w26-v6mr11798211otd.292.1522895994129; Wed, 04 Apr 2018 19:39:54 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <CAOgPGoAhzEtxpW5mzmkf2kv3AcugNy0dAzhvpaqrTSuMSqWqfw@mail.gmail.com> <EDB0F480-1272-4364-9A3D-23F9E1A02141@dukhovni.org> <CABkgnnWBdp=KtmBVDcrR9-5tdVPfhWG7pWR0FE57H=iWS37dWw@mail.gmail.com> <C52564E1-ABCD-4E1A-8517-19743BD2180B@dukhovni.org> <CABcZeBMcvtQ6Ko-2Rmoq3BSVBOqdQwJ65vVrPK0cpSJ9nQCS3w@mail.gmail.com> <20180405022007.GG25259@localhost> <CAL02cgSOQVZR96Veh7EEMCoQO7-+5ucdBiAUcAXGt6QFEopXNA@mail.gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAL02cgSOQVZR96Veh7EEMCoQO7-+5ucdBiAUcAXGt6QFEopXNA@mail.gmail.com>
From: Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx>
Date: Thu, 05 Apr 2018 02:39:43 +0000
Message-ID: <CAL02cgTQgpAGBv1+-2GTCPSgNDD5TMd0xQw8bQDpe9BiacBarA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000c2a7fa056910dac1"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/c7zOiKTAsrGM3USb-jckQfLZYmM>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Consensus Call on draft-ietf-tls-dnssec-chain-extension
X-BeenThere: tls@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.22
Precedence: list
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/tls/>
List-Post: <mailto:tls@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls>, <mailto:tls-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 05 Apr 2018 02:39:57 -0000

Re-adding the list.

On Wed, Apr 4, 2018, 22:39 Richard Barnes <rlb@ipv.sx> wrote:

>
>
> On Wed, Apr 4, 2018, 22:34 Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Apr 04, 2018 at 07:22:38PM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> > I don't think that this comparison is particularly apt.The
>> > representation in HSTS is simply "I support HSTS". The representation
>> > in HPKP is "I will use either consistent keying material *or* a
>> > consistent set of CAs". The representation here is "I will continue to
>> > have DNSSEC-signed DANE records". That is a significantly more risky
>> > proposition than continuing to support TLS (and I'm ignoring the risk
>> > of hijacking attacks that people were concerned with with HPKP), and
>> > so this seems rather more like HPKP to me.
>>
>> Without a TTL (with zero meaning "clear the pin to DANE") this extension
>> can only really be used with mandatory-to-use-with-DANE protocols, where
>> the commitment to "continue to have DNSSEC-signed DANE records" is
>> implied.
>>
>
> This is just not true.  As I said in my earlier message, servers can
> switch based on the ClientHello.
>
> Clients advertise which methods they support, servers switch, and they
> both see how often DANE gets used.  When it gets high enough, they turn off
> the fallback.  Just like every other TLS feature we've ever done.
>
> --Richard
>
>
>
>> The TTL allows one to put a bound on that commitment, thus alleviating
>> the risk.
>>
>> That's the whole point: to alleviate the risk of commitment to DANE in
>> order to not discourage opportunistic deployment.
>>
>> Nico
>> --
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>

v2.15.0 | Report a Bug | By Email