Re: [TLS] Francesca Palombini's No Objection on draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-14: (with COMMENT)

[Sean Turner <[e-mail]>]

Hi! We closed the loop on this one, and Roman wanted to make sure this got back.

> On Apr 4, 2021, at 06:57, Francesca Palombini via Datatracker <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Francesca Palombini has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-14: No Objection
> 
> When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this
> introductory paragraph, however.)
> 
> 
> Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> 
> 
> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator/
> 
> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> COMMENT:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> Thank you for the work on this document, and thank you to the doc shepherd for
> the in-depth background. Please find some comments below.
> 
> Francesca
> 
> 2. -----
> 
>   used to send the authenticator request SHOULD use a secure with
>   equivalent security to TLS, such as QUIC [QUIC-TLS], as its as its
> 
> FP: What are the implications of not using such a secure transport protocol?
> Why is it just RECOMMENDED and not MANDATED? nits: missing word "use a secure
> with" ; remove one of the duplicated "as its". (Note: this text appears again
> with the same typos for the authenticator in section 5)

We roped Jonathan in and he’s what he had to say:

> Begin forwarded message:
> 
> From: Jonathan Hoyland <[e-mail]>
> Subject: Re: Datatracker State Update Notice: <draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator-15.txt>
> Date: May 6, 2022 at 12:16:34 EDT
> To: Christopher Wood <[e-mail]>
> Cc: Paul Wouters <[e-mail]>, Sean Turner <[e-mail]>, Roman Danyliw <[e-mail]>, Christopher Wood <[e-mail]>, [e-mail], TLS Chairs <[e-mail]>
> 
> The EA is equally secure if sent over an entirely unsecured medium. 
> The only reason to have a SHOULD there is because if you send the EA over a plaintext channel you reveal the Server certificate.
> 
> In most cases it will make sense to send the EA over the channel that's already there, but from a security perspective there's no reason to require it.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jonathan

Cheers,
spt