Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3
Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org> Tue, 01 March 2016 04:52 UTC
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Date: Mon, 29 Feb 2016 20:52:11 -0800
From: Andrey Jivsov <crypto@brainhub.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3
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On 02/29/2016 02:36 PM, Hanno Böck wrote: > We have an RFC for PSS since 2003. > We had several attacks showing the weakness of PKCS #1 1.5. In the face of such danger, what's your opinion on PKCS #1.5 signatures being perfectly fine in TLS 1.3 ? I refer to signatures in X.509 certs in the latest https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-11. Why not ban PKCS #1.5 altogether from TLS 1.3? It will not only make TLS 1.3 more secure, but code simpler and footprint smaller. Besides, it's reasonable: TLS 1.2 already allows PSS in X.509 certs. You are arguing for the benefit of suddenly mandating a steel door on a grass hut. Joseph Salowey's proposal gives an option for the door, consistent with how TLS 1.2 does this for X.509 certs.
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Russ Housley
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Joseph Salowey
- [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Benjamin Beurdouche
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Brian Smith
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Salz, Rich
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Alyssa Rowan
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Thomson
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Andrey Jivsov
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Rob Stradling
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dave Garrett
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Dang, Quynh (Fed)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hanno Böck
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Fedor Brunner
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hannes Mehnert
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Ilari Liusvaara
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri
- [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is enou… Rene Struik
- Re: [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is … Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL
- Re: [TLS] (TLS1.3 - algorithm agility support is … Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Scott Fluhrer (sfluhrer)
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Hubert Kario
- Re: [TLS] RSA-PSS in TLS 1.3 Tony Arcieri