Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 comments

Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Mon, 17 August 2015 14:43 UTC

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From: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com>
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Date: Mon, 17 Aug 2015 16:43:41 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] TLS 1.3 comments
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On Monday 17 August 2015 15:02:46 Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
> On Mon, Aug 17, 2015 at 06:22:04AM -0400, Yaron Sheffer wrote:
> >     Below a long list of comments, generally minor. The document is
> >     already very good - we're making great progress!<br>
> >     
> >       The record length field is limited by encrypted-length+2048.
> >       
> >         Shouldn't it be 1024? - "Each AEAD cipher MUST NOT produce an
> >         expansion of greater than 1024 bytes".
> 
> Actually, I think both should be 256 (256-byte expansion from AEAD
> is already quite much).
> 
> (This was proposed a while back).

I don't think this adds anything while introducing requirement of adding 
additional "if" to implementations that support also TLS1.2 and lower

> >       D.1.2: do we really need to worry about version rollback to
> >       
> >         SSLv2? I suggest to remove this section.
> 
> Well, it is not possible to even try to negotiate TLS 1.3 using SSLv2
> compat. hello, since that can't transmit extensions, but at least one
> extension is REQUIRED in order to successfully negotiate TLS 1.3.
> 
> And the second paragraph seems to be about RSA key exchange, which
> isn't supported anymore in TLS 1.3.
> 
> Yes, the section looks like it could be removed.

OTOH, TLS1.3 is not a superset of TLS1.2 so we need to think about downgrade 
to TLS1.2. 

> But that isn't the only way rollback attacks can occur, also some
> clients can be coaxed to downgrade by selectively blocking connections.
> Unfortunately the intolerance to TLS 1.3 is so bad that many clients
> will likely be willing to perform unauthenticated downgrade to TLS
> 1.2 (and FALLBACK_SCSV is useless here).

how is it useless?

A server which support at most TLS1.2 that receives a TLS1.2 client hello with 
FALLBACK_SCSV MUST continue the connection with TLS1.2
-- 
Regards,
Hubert Kario
Quality Engineer, QE BaseOS Security team
Web: www.cz.redhat.com
Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purkyňova 99/71, 612 45, Brno, Czech Republic