Re: [TLS] I-D Action: draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06.txt

I took a quick look, and it looks OK to me.

Barry

On Mon, Jul 6, 2015 at 5:31 AM, Stephen Farrell
<stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie> wrote:
>
> Hiya,
>
> I've checked the changes here resulting from IESG review and I
> think they're either editorial and fine or else they do reflect
> the recent list and IESG discussion.
>
> So I plan to send the approval announcement for this later today.
> Since the changes look biggish, it'd be good if someone else could
> check the diff [1] and agree that there were no bloopers introduced.
>
> Please don't re-litigate issues already discussed though, but keep
> to validating that the authors' correctly handled the recent list
> and IESG discussion.
>
> Thanks,
> S.
>
> [1]
> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-05&url2=draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06
>
>
> On 05/07/15 12:14, internet-drafts@ietf.org wrote:
>>
>> A New Internet-Draft is available from the on-line Internet-Drafts directories.
>>  This draft is a work item of the Transport Layer Security Working Group of the IETF.
>>
>>         Title           : Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension
>>         Authors         : Karthikeyan Bhargavan
>>                           Antoine Delignat-Lavaud
>>                           Alfredo Pironti
>>                           Adam Langley
>>                           Marsh Ray
>>       Filename        : draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06.txt
>>       Pages           : 15
>>       Date            : 2015-07-05
>>
>> Abstract:
>>    The Transport Layer Security (TLS) master secret is not
>>    cryptographically bound to important session parameters such as the
>>    server certificate.  Consequently, it is possible for an active
>>    attacker to set up two sessions, one with a client and another with a
>>    server, such that the master secrets on the two sessions are the
>>    same.  Thereafter, any mechanism that relies on the master secret for
>>    authentication, including session resumption, becomes vulnerable to a
>>    man-in-the-middle attack, where the attacker can simply forward
>>    messages back and forth between the client and server.  This
>>    specification defines a TLS extension that contextually binds the
>>    master secret to a log of the full handshake that computes it, thus
>>    preventing such attacks.
>>
>>
>> The IETF datatracker status page for this draft is:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash/
>>
>> There's also a htmlized version available at:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06
>>
>> A diff from the previous version is available at:
>> https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url2=draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-06
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> Internet-Drafts are also available by anonymous FTP at:
>> ftp://ftp.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
>>
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>>
>>