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"Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu> writes:

> On Tue, 16 May 2006 19:07:51 +0200, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
> <nmav@gnutls.org> wrote:
>
>> On Tue 16 May 2006 16:50, Eric Rescorla wrote:
>> 
>> > > I'd disagree that it is that simple to fix that: If the draft
>> > > permit more than one key, I believe it has to describe how
>> > > implementations are supposed to use more than one key to build the
>> > > chain, or at least mandate some specific behaviour.
>> > I don't agree with this. PGP at least theoretically knows how
>> > to build cert chains from a "bucket of keys".
>> 
>> Maybe but I still find no point in sending a bucket of keys just like 
>> that. If it is to be sent it has to be clearly defined what it is 
>> expected in this bucket and so on. I'm quite reluctant to do it because 
>> I don't need nor find a use for this functionality. It can be easily 
>> added by anyone that need it[0], and I would be willing to include the 
>> required changes in this or a future update, if somebody needs it and 
>> defines the semantics of a key list.
>> 
> The problem is that you don't know the recipient's trust anchors or trust
> metrics.  Without that, you have to send the whole graph (or at least as
> much of it as you have), to maximize the chances of the key being accepted.

Right, I understand that this is a problem in principle, but I'm
not sure that it's a problem in practice. In particular, I'm not
sure that it's so bad a problem in practice that the protocol should
be explicitly designed to prohibit people who think they understand
the trust graph from giving hints.

-Ekr

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Re: [TLS] Re: Review of draft-ietf-tls-openpgp-keys-08