[TLS] Device Pairing - PAKEs v SAS

Dennis Jackson <ietf@dennis-jackson.uk> Wed, 30 July 2025 11:15 UTC

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Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2025 12:15:52 +0100
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From: Dennis Jackson <ietf@dennis-jackson.uk>
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Subject: [TLS] Device Pairing - PAKEs v SAS
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I wanted to follow up on this specific use case but don't want to 
pollute the PAKEs adoption thread where I already indicated support for 
adoption.

On 29/07/2025 21:30, Richard Barnes wrote:
> This is a digression, but I've heard a few people mention SAS: SAS 
> requires a very different UX from PAKE, worse for both users and 
> security.  SAS is about post-hoc confirmation of a handshake-specific 
> value, which means:
>
> 1. You need a way to at least display, if not input, dynamic data on 
> both sides of the transaction.  As opposed to say printing something 
> on the outside of a device and scanning it from the other.
> 2. Users need to compare these dynamic values
> 3. If the user skips or mis-compares the values, the handshake succeeds
>
> PAKE requires less capability in the devices and less work from the 
> user, and fails safe in the event of user error.

I think this is quite a bit more nuanced than you suggest, but I do 
recognize there are some scenarios with low-capability devices where 
PAKEs provide a small benefit.

If at least one device (A) has a display and the other device (B) has an 
input mechanism, PAKEs and SAS provide equivalent UX. You display the 
SAS (or PAKE key) on A and ask the user to enter it on B. B rejects if 
the entry doesn't match the SAS or the PAKE KEX fails. The UX and 
security is identical.

If A and B only have displays, you can do SAS but not a PAKE.

If A and B only have input mechanisms, you can do a PAKE but not SAS.

If A has neither a display nor an input mechanism, then you're down to a 
hardcoded secret which needs to be entered on B. If you can use a PAKE, 
it can be a low entropy secret. Otherwise, it needs to be high entropy. 
In both cases, you'd want to offer it via barcode, QR code, NFC or 
whatever. I recognize PAKEs make for a marginally nicer UX in this 
scenario, but it'd be even nicer not to ship devices with hardcoded secrets.

>
> On Mon, Jul 28, 2025 at 1:24 AM Dennis Jackson 
> <ietf=40dennis-jackson.uk@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>
>     I support adoption.
>
>     I'm somewhat skeptical there's a device pairing scenario in which
>     PAKEs
>     are worth the investment over SAS, but it seems like there's
>     plenty of
>     folks interested in deploying this and I can see the value in
>     getting it
>     right.
>