Re: [TLS] No more GMT exposure in the handshake

Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net> Sat, 07 June 2014 17:26 UTC

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Date: Sat, 07 Jun 2014 13:26:31 -0400
From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
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To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] No more GMT exposure in the handshake
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On 06/07/2014 10:56 AM, Watson Ladd wrote:
> Putting the clock time in the TLS handshake enables fingerprinting.
> It's useless cryptographically: 32 random bytes is exceedingly
> unlikely to repeat.

There seems to be a growing consensus on this point:

  https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-mathewson-no-gmtunixtime

	--dkg