Re: [TLS] What's up with TACK?

Hanno Böck <> Thu, 18 June 2015 11:19 UTC

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Date: Thu, 18 Jun 2015 13:20:41 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] What's up with TACK?
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I'm a bit surprised that nobody seems to care to answer here.

CA failures still happen on a quite regular basis. We recently had
CNNIC, ANSSI and India CCA. I think this is the elephant in the room of
TLS problems.

HPKP makes me have very mixed feelings. On the one hand I'm happy that
we have something at last, but on the other hand I fear that people
might move into the "we now have a solution for HTTPS" direction and
neglect other uses of TLS. I'd be worried if we consider non-HTTPS-TLS
a second-best security solution.

Also from my understanding TACK also solves another problem:
STARTTLS-stripping (draft, chapter 5.2), which is as far as I'm aware
also otherwise an unsolved issue (see e.g. [1]).

In other words: I support Aarons request to adopt TACK or something

Hanno Böck