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[TLS] Re: Feedback on draft-bmw-tls-pake13-01.txt

Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com> Mon, 17 March 2025 17:02 UTC

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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 17 Mar 2025 10:02:13 -0700
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Feedback on draft-bmw-tls-pake13-01.txt
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On Mon, Mar 17, 2025 at 9:38 AM Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:

>
> As above, I don't see what this has to do with PAKEs at all. If you have a
> third
> party authentication system, whether sign in with Apple, Google, or some
> SSO
> provider, then you don't need to share any secret with the relying party.
>

In my mind, the idea is that you don't have to rely solely on WebPKI if you
have that information handy after registration. I am not sure what the
authors' intent is, but that is what I thought of. Maybe it's just so one
can register home devices that play a sound during setup, or take a picture
like a smart watch pairing.

At the time I was looking at this problem, there were some addresses on
these devices that couldn't be MITMed even with admin privileges. I asked
about the addresses for these features and I did get a response. It was
"why are you asking about this?" :) Then, I found IT security people fuming
about this issue online. So, I decided to let it be.

thanks,
Rob

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