Re: [TLS] datacenter TLS decryption as a three-party protocol

[Ted Lemon <[e-mail]>]

This is exactly right.   We have a *real* problem here.   We should *really*
solve it.   We should do the math.   :)

On Wed, Jul 19, 2017 at 3:09 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <[e-mail]> wrote:

> As Stephen noted in his presentation, a lot of the proposals for passive
> decryption can be seen as trying to turn TLS from a two-party protocol into
> a three-party protocol.  Which is probably the right way to think about it,
> even when all (three) parties are within the same administrative domain.
>
> Stephen also said something about it being hard to shoehorn a three-party
> protocol into the API for a two party protocol.  But depending on the
> specifics, maybe it's not so bad.  For example, if the only semantics you
> need are a new API for "this is the list of third parties I authorize to
> wiretap this connection", the scope seems fairly limited.
>
> Another thought spawned from today's session is that, given concerns about
> preventing/noticing if schemes intended for the datacenter leak out onto
> the internet, it's not really clear that "minimizes changes to the wire
> protocol" should be considered a benefit of proposals in this space.  If
> there are clear changes to the wire protocol, that makes it easy to detect
> when the scheme is in use.
>
> -Ben
>
> _______________________________________________
> TLS mailing list
> [e-mail]
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>