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[TLS] Re: Complaint to ADs and IESG regarding TLS WG chairs falsely claiming WG consensus to issue an RFC for draft-ietf-tls-mldsa

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Wed, 27 May 2026 21:08 UTC

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Date: Wed, 27 May 2026 16:08:23 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
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References: <20260519112813.1254795.qmail@cr.yp.to> <CAGgd1Ocy8f4HeQy-qWauAJAxizznXdXA53kWVp_FV1QUVGuxWw@mail.gmail.com> <5DFBF81F-4A98-4C5E-A060-580DC6960021@symbolic.software> <87v7c8lgt8.fsf@josefsson.org> <CACsn0cmaOdG4vCdeOVSxAPnJtPRH8rBJ3sfAY3o0f1fm-ouceg@mail.gmail.com>
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CC: Simon Josefsson <simon=40josefsson.org@dmarc.ietf.org>, Nadim Kobeissi <nadim@symbolic.software>, TLS List <tls@ietf.org>, "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>, stndrds-inacio@andrew.cmu.edu, "<iesg@ietf.org>" <iesg@ietf.org>
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Subject: [TLS] Re: Complaint to ADs and IESG regarding TLS WG chairs falsely claiming WG consensus to issue an RFC for draft-ietf-tls-mldsa
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On Wed, May 27, 2026 at 02:01:08PM -0700, Watson Ladd wrote:
> On Wed, May 27, 2026, 1:48 PM Simon Josefsson <simon=
> 40josefsson.org@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> > Repeating that statement doesn't make it true.  The analog motivation
> > for doing PQ hybrids is Man-In-The-Middle attacks.  If your non-hybrid
> > PQ signature has a weakness (e.g., implementation bug), it facilitate
> > man-in-the-middle's.
> >
> 
> The only way to achieve that is to have a quantum computer at the time of
> attack

Not so.  Find the victim's classical public key (they'll gladly tell you
it), use a quantum computer to break it off-line and recover the private
key, then use the private key at will to impersonate the victim, then
its counterparties become victims too.

Nico
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