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Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt

Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> Tue, 10 September 2013 09:47 UTC

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Date: Tue, 10 Sep 2013 11:47:18 +0200
From: Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-sheffer-tls-bcp-00.txt
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On Sun, 08 Sep 2013 11:25:59 +0300
Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:

> This is an early version of my proposal for a BCP-like document, to 
> inform the industry on what can be done with existing
> implementations, while TLS 1.3 is still not ready.
> 
> I would appreciate your comments of course. Specifically,
> I would like to fill in the Implementation Status table (Sec. 5) and 
> would be glad to receive solid information (dates, planned dates, 
> version numbers) from implementers.

I was asked on another list to cross-post my comments on it here:

I don't really see from the document why the authors discourage
ECDHE-suites and AES-256. Both should be okay and we end up with four
suites:
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Also, DHE should only be considered secure with a large enough modulus
(>=2048 bit). Apache hard-fixes this to 1024 bit and it's not  
configurable. So there even can be made an argument that ECDHE is more
secure - it doesn't have a widely deployed webserver using it in an
insecure way.


-- 
Hanno Böck
http://hboeck.de/

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