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Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13

Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> Mon, 22 May 2017 17:27 UTC

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To: TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>, Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Date: Mon, 22 May 2017 12:27:52 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] AD Review of draft-ietf-tls-tls13
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On 05/22/2017 12:17 PM, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
>> On May 22, 2017, at 1:06 PM, Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> wrote:
>>
>> Given the apparent strength of opinion against removing these supposed restrictions entirely, it seems like this text (or something similar) is probably the best we can do.
> Perhaps so, but I saw only one strong objection from Dave Garrett.  Is that

There was also some discussion when this text was originally going in,
IIRC.  But I do not remember well enough to say who/how many people
wanted it.

> sufficient for "apparent strength of opinion"?  Removal is simpler, and it
> sure does not look like people are determined to continue to support MD5
> and SHA-1 in certificates, but would be willing to relent if TLS 1.3 told
> them not to.  Isn't the language in question tackling a non-problem?

It probably is, but I don't feel a need to spend a lot of my time
pushing for it to be removed.

-Ben

> That said, if the only way to rough consensus is a properly qualified
> requirement to not rely on such certificate signatures for authentication,
> (rather than must hang up with a fatal alert when you see these, must not
> send these, ...) then I'll go along with a compromise.
>

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