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Re: [TLS] Data volume limits

Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> Wed, 16 December 2015 04:08 UTC

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From: Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com>
To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Dec 2015 23:08:08 -0500
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Data volume limits
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On Tuesday, December 15, 2015 10:59:35 pm Martin Thomson wrote:
> On 16 December 2015 at 14:57, Dave Garrett <davemgarrett@gmail.com> wrote:
> > In fact, if we're OK with setting this rather low threshold, then we could even get rid of the rekey signal entirely and just have an automatic rekey after every 4GiB for all ciphers. That'd be one less complexity to deal with. Rekeys would be routine.
> 
> I don't like automatic rekey (though I almost like the per-record
> rekeying that I think was semi-facetiously suggested by someone).  An
> explicit rekey allows for two things:
>  - testing
>  - reducing the limit if we find that the cipher is more busted than
> we originally thought (with respect to key overuse)

On Tuesday, December 15, 2015 11:01:41 pm Eric Rescorla wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 15, 2015 at 7:59 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
> wrote:
> Also, allows each side to have their own opinion.

We could just make the threshold a configurable parameter, with default/maximum at 2^32 bytes. Each endpoint could just provide its threshold in a new extension. Both get to specify what they want and it could be lowered arbitrarily for testing or panic fix.


Dave

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