Re: [TLS] An SCSV to stop TLS fallback.

Hi Ralf,

I like the idea of pinning the version number, but I don't think it will 
work well in clusters without significant tinkering (i.e., protocol 
changes): the client connects to cluster member A which has just 
upgraded to TLS 1.3 and immediately pins that server to 1.3. Now it 
connects to another cluster member which is still on TLS 1.2, and the 
connection is reset.

I don't understand how you could pin "ECDHE" - you would need to define 
whether DHE is better or worse than ECDHE, and I don't think we want to 
make that judgment call.

Thanks,
	Yaron

On 12/07/2013 12:31 AM, Ralf Skyper Kaiser wrote:
> Hi,
>
> the draft only concerns HTTPS (no other client side implementation
> attempts a reconnect when it receives
> a RST on  TLS 1.x [which is bad to start with but apparently necessary]).
>
> A solution that solves some of the mentioned problems without any
> protocol change is
> to pin the TLS version the same way as certificates are pinned. And
> while pinning the TLS
> version it should also be considered to pin the cipher suite ("Use this
> cipher suite or
> a better one").
>
> After first connect the client will not allow any lesser security (TLS
> 1.3, ECDHE, ..) than the one
> used on last connect.
>
> regards,
>
> ralf
>
>
> On Wed, Nov 27, 2013 at 1:42 AM, Brian Smith <brian@briansmith.org
> <mailto:brian@briansmith.org>> wrote:
>
>     On Mon, Nov 25, 2013 at 3:27 PM, Adam Langley <agl@google.com
>     <mailto:agl@google.com>> wrote:
>      >   In the event that a client is making a fallback connection, it
>      > includes TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV (0x5600) in the list of cipher suites. A
>      > current server which sees this cipher suite in a ClientHello SHOULD
>      > return a fatal alert, inappropriate_fallback (86) and abort the
>      > connection.
>
>     Adam, I think what you propose makes sense. However, I think it might
>     not be ideal if there are any circumstances where the browser could
>     accidentally fall back to a lower version--e.g. falling back after a
>     timeout or falling back in response to the connection being reset.
>     AFAICT, we currently have to do fallback from TLS 1.2 -> TLS 1.1 and
>     from TLS 1.1 -> TLS 1.0 in response to connection resets. There will
>     be some false positives here. In addition to potentially reducing the
>     security of the connection, these fallback connections add a lot of
>     latency. If we attempt a fallback connection in response to a
>     connection reset, and we receive an inappropriate_fallback alert, then
>     we'd have to make yet *another* connection without the fallback. All
>     other things being equal, it would be better if the server could
>     respond respond exactly as it would with a TLS 1.2 ClientHello,
>     without downgrading the cipher suite or any other feature, more like
>     what Martin Rex suggested.
>
>     However, I don't think it is realistic to backport features all the
>     way to SSL 3.0. The information in the TLS extensions is too
>     important, and trying to define good defaults for missing extensions
>     that make sense long-term seems like it will just bind our hands too
>     much in the future.
>
>     So, we should could consider backporting TLS 1.2 cipher suites to TLS
>     1.1 and TLS 1.0, but then using your suggested inappropriate_fallback
>     for for SSL 3.0 handshakes only.
>
>     Whether this complication is justified depends on how frequently we
>     receive false-positive connection resets (and anything else that can
>     be a false positive) and how much we care about optimizing performance
>     for that case.
>
>     Cheers,
>     Brian
>     --
>     Mozilla Networking/Crypto/Security (Necko/NSS/PSM)
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