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From: Rob Sayre <sayrer@gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 30 Mar 2024 11:01:59 -0700
Message-ID: <CAChr6SwoKqvrsKbm-K3vK793sn0p1WR2wky8cJSR-JbHytEBiA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>
Cc: Ted Lemon <mellon@fugue.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>, dnsdir@ietf.org,
 draft-ietf-tls-svcb-ech.all@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Dnsdir early review of draft-ietf-tls-svcb-ech-01
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On Sat, Mar 30, 2024 at 10:47=E2=80=AFAM Erik Nygren <erik+ietf@nygren.org>=
 wrote:

>
> An attacker who can prevent SVCB resolution can deny clients any
> associated security benefits.
>
>
Yes.


> A hostile recursive resolver can always deny service to SVCB queries, but
> network intermediaries can often prevent resolution as well, even when th=
e
> client and recursive resolver validate DNSSEC and use a secure transport.
> These downgrade attacks can prevent a client from being aware that "ech" =
is
> configured which would result in the client sending the ClientHello in
> cleartext.
>
>
I think s/would/could/ here.

I don't know if we want to write it, but doesn't using encrypted transport
DNS to an IP address avoid this problem? Like using 1.1.1.1 or 8.8.8.8 etc.
I know that raises centralization issues, but it does help with this issue.

thanks,
Rob

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<div dir=3D"ltr"><div dir=3D"ltr">On Sat, Mar 30, 2024 at 10:47=E2=80=AFAM =
Erik Nygren &lt;<a href=3D"mailto:erik%2Bietf@nygren.org">erik+ietf@nygren.=
org</a>&gt; wrote:</div><div class=3D"gmail_quote"><blockquote class=3D"gma=
il_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-le=
ft-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div di=
r=3D"ltr"><div style=3D"font-family:tahoma,sans-serif"><br></div><blockquot=
e class=3D"gmail_default gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;bor=
der-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,20=
4);padding-left:1ex">An attacker who can prevent SVCB resolution can deny c=
lients any associated security benefits.</blockquote></div></blockquote><di=
v><br></div><div>Yes.</div><div>=C2=A0</div><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quot=
e" style=3D"margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-styl=
e:solid;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex"><div dir=3D"lt=
r"><blockquote class=3D"gmail_default gmail_quote" style=3D"margin:0px 0px =
0px 0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-style:solid;border-left-color:r=
gb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">A hostile recursive resolver can always d=
eny service to SVCB queries, but network intermediaries can often prevent r=
esolution as well, even when the client and recursive resolver validate DNS=
SEC and use a secure transport. These downgrade attacks can prevent a clien=
t from being aware that &quot;ech&quot; is configured which would result in=
 the client sending the ClientHello in cleartext.</blockquote></div></block=
quote><div><br></div><div>I think s/would/could/ here.</div><div><br></div>=
<div>I don&#39;t know if we want to write it, but doesn&#39;t=C2=A0using en=
crypted transport DNS to an IP=C2=A0address avoid this problem? Like using =
1.1.1.1 or 8.8.8.8 etc. I know that raises centralization issues, but it do=
es help with this issue.</div><div><br></div><div>thanks,</div><div>Rob</di=
v><div><br></div></div></div>

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