Re: [TLS] Encrypted SNI (was: Privacy considerations - identity hiding from eavesdropping in (D)TLS)

"Dang, Quynh" <> Fri, 25 September 2015 18:20 UTC

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From: "Dang, Quynh" <>
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Thread-Topic: [TLS] Encrypted SNI (was: Privacy considerations - identity hiding from eavesdropping in (D)TLS)
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2015 18:20:08 +0000
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Encrypted SNI (was: Privacy considerations - identity hiding from eavesdropping in (D)TLS)
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How about making fixed length(s) for each message type, then pad it with 0x01 then optional 0x00s?


From: TLS <> on behalf of Dave Garrett <>
Sent: Friday, September 25, 2015 2:11 PM
Subject: Re: [TLS] Encrypted SNI (was: Privacy considerations - identity hiding from eavesdropping in (D)TLS)

On Friday, September 25, 2015 01:10:37 pm Martin Rex wrote:
> Because it is not necessarily immediately obvious, you will need
> padding also for the Server Certificate handshake messages.
> And, because the key exchange is side-effected by properties of
> the Server Certificate, you may additionally need padding for the
> ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange handshake messages, so
> that the protocol doesn't leak of one of the service uses
> an RSA certificate and the other uses an ECDSA (or EdDSA) certificate.

This sounds like a good argument to come up with a default padding scheme for all handshake messages for even clients that don't use application data padding.


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