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Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT

Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com> Sun, 04 June 2017 20:57 UTC

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To: Victor Vasiliev <vasilvv@google.com>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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From: Benjamin Kaduk <bkaduk@akamai.com>
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Date: Sun, 04 Jun 2017 15:57:04 -0500
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/eQShbGtYCRxILVrrceLPIOgVT-Y>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Security review of TLS1.3 0-RTT
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On 06/02/2017 04:49 PM, Victor Vasiliev wrote:
>
>     4. If implemented properly, both a single-use ticket and a
>        strike-register style mechanism make it possible to limit
>        the number of 0-RTT copies which are processed to 1 within
>        a given zone (where a zone is defined as having consistent
>        storage), so the number of accepted copies of the 0-RTT
>        data is N where N is the number of zones.
>
>
> Correct.  Session caches are inherently bound to a single zone.

I think we covered this in a couple other messages in a different
subthread, but to be super-clear, 1-RTT session caches can be scoped to
a larger zone than 0-RTT acceptability, at the server's unilateral
discretion.

-Ben

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