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Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Wed, 07 May 2014 23:48 UTC

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Date: Wed, 07 May 2014 16:48:02 -0700
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] The risk of misconfiguration
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On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 4:42 PM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
> On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 6:39 PM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> wrote:
>> On Wed, May 7, 2014 at 4:14 PM, Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> wrote:
>>> I'm assuming this will get fixed.  Are you assuming it won't?  Please explain.
>>
>> If it gets fixed anonymous DH will work just fine for channel binding:
>> the premaster secret will always be unique.
>
> Clearly.  No one disagrees with that.  You're making statements that
> implicitly assume it's not fixed, so I want to know if you're assuming
> it won't be fixed.
>
> Also, really, this is an ancillary issue being dealt with in a
> separate thread.  It's NOT germane to your proposal to remove features
> that the rest of us don't want removed.  Please address the arguments
> against removal.

I changed my mind about anonymous DH: it's useful enough in SASL to
keep. You replied to a message that had this sentence in it.

I think the null encryption cipher should definitely stay out: the
only use I've heard of is extremely niche, namely large datasets with
slow CPUs on both ends.

SIncerely,
Watson Ladd
>
> Nico
> --



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