Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
Juho Vähä-Herttua <juhovh@iki.fi> Mon, 28 July 2014 21:23 UTC
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From: Juho Vähä-Herttua <juhovh@iki.fi>
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Date: Tue, 29 Jul 2014 00:23:50 +0300
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To: Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net>
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Cc: "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type
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> On 29.7.2014, at 0.15, Colm MacCárthaigh <colm@allcosts.net> wrote: > > On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 8:14 AM, Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos > <nmav@redhat.com> wrote: >> On the contrary, all _new_ ciphers are stream (GCM, CCM) > > Now you've got me scratching my head, because both GCM and CCM are > authentication modes for block ciphers, not stream. They are both authenticated counter modes for block ciphers, which means they behave like stream ciphers. Even though the output from the cipher comes in blocks, all redundant bytes in the end can be dropped, unlike in CBC mode. Therefore 2 byte alert encrypted with GCM or CCM is still 2 bytes plus the authentication tag. I believe this is what Nikos meant. Juho
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Fabrice Gautier
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
- [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Watson Ladd
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Juho Vähä-Herttua
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Daniel Kahn Gillmor
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Brian Sniffen
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Stephen Farrell
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Michael StJohns
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Yoav Nir
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Colm MacCárthaigh
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Andy Lutomirski
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Peter Gutmann
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Martin Rex
- Re: [TLS] Encryption of TLS 1.3 content type Alfredo Pironti