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Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3

Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com> Thu, 29 September 2016 07:02 UTC

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From: Ryan Carboni <ryacko@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 00:01:27 -0700
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Industry Concerns about TLS 1.3
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I've never quite understood what TLS was supposed to be protecting against,
and whether or not it has done so successfully, or has the potential to do
so successfully.

Well, I don't think anyone here even knows how to protect a mailing list
from multi-billion dollar threat actors so...???

Let me quote RFC 3526:
"The
   strengths of the groups defined here are always estimates and there
   are as many methods to estimate them as there are cryptographers."

But whatever. You people aren't even willing to do what the Germans did...
twice.

Personally I think TLS should be scrapped, replaced with a protocol without
negotiation, replace PKI with trusted notaries (
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convergence_(SSL) ), etc.

But, no one has been able to program anything correctly, not even
certificate authorities:

https://www.schrauger.com/the-story-of-how-wosign-gave-me-an-ssl-certificate-for-github-com

I'm not paying you people anyway. At least the protocol is theoretically
secure.

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