Re: [TLS] judging consensus on keys used in handshake and data messages

[Hugo Krawczyk <[e-mail]>]

I do not have an objection to option 1 if re-phrased as
Option 1 - use the same key for protecting both *post*-handshake and
applications messages..

I believe this is what was intended by that option anyway. Let me clarify.

I understand the question as relating *only* to post-handshake messages and
not
to the main handshake (three initial flights). For the latter we have key
separation in the sense that none of these main-handshake messages is
encrypted
under the application key but rather under dedicated handshake keys. This
should
not be changed as it provides key indistinguishability to the application
key, a
desirable design and analysis (=proof) modularity property.

On the other hand, for post-handshake messages, and particularly for
encrypting
post-handshake client authentication messages, preserving key
indistinguishability is not relevant since at the time of post-handshake
client authentication, the application key has already lost its
indistinguishability
by the mere fact that the key was used to encrypt application data. Key
indistinguishability is the main reason to insist in key separation and this
principle does not apply here anymore hence removing the objection to 1.

I'd note that the best one could hope for in the post-handshake setting is
that
as a result of post-handshake client authentication the application key
becomes
a secure mutually-authenticated key for providing "secure channels"
security.
As pointed out by others in previous posts I have an analysis showing that
this
delayed mutual authentication guarantee is achieved even if one uses the
application key to encrypt the post-handshake messages. I have circulated a
preliminary version of the  paper among cryptographers working on TLS 1.3
and  I will post a public copy next week so this can be scrutinized further.

Hugo


On Thu, Jul 7, 2016 at 1:10 AM, Karthikeyan Bhargavan <
[e-mail]> wrote:

> If we are left with 1 or 3, the miTLS team would prefer 1.
>
> On the cryptographic side, Hugo has a recent (draft) paper that seems to
> provide
> some more justification for (1), at least for client authentication.
>
> I know this is a bit off-topic, but the miTLS team would also like to get
> rid of 0-RTT ClientFinished
> if that is the only message left in the 0-RTT encrypted handshake flight.
> That should remove
> another Handshake/Data key separation from the protocol, leaving only 3
> keys: 0-RTT data,
> 1-RTT handshake, and 1-RTT data.
>
> Best,
> -Karthik
>
>
> On 07 Jul 2016, at 02:49, David Benjamin <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Jul 6, 2016 at 5:39 PM Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Jul 6, 2016 at 5:24 PM, Dave Garrett <[e-mail]>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wednesday, July 06, 2016 06:19:29 pm David Benjamin wrote:
>>> > I'm also curious which post-handshake messages are the problem. If we
>>> were
>>> > to rename "post-handshake handshake messages" to "post-handshake bonus
>>> > messages" with a distinct bonus_message record type, where would there
>>> > still be an issue? (Alerts and application data share keys and this
>>> seems
>>> > to have been fine.)
>>>
>>> Recasting all the post-handshake handshake messages as not something
>>> named "handshake" does make a degree of sense, on its own. (bikeshedding:
>>> I'd name it something more descriptive like "secondary negotiation"
>>> messages or something, though.) Even if this doesn't directly help with the
>>> issue at hand here, does forking these into a new ContentType sound like a
>>> useful move, in general?
>>
>>
>> I'm not sure what this would accomplish.
>>
>
> Me neither. To clarify, I mention this not as a suggestion, but to
> motivate asking about the type of message. If the only reason the proofs
> want them in the handshake bucket rather than the application data bucket
> is that they say "handshake" in them then, sure, let's do an
> inconsequential re-spelling and move on from this problem.
>
> But presumably something about the messages motivate this key separation
> issue and I'd like to know what they are.
>
> David
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