Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extension draft
Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Thu, 26 April 2018 16:06 UTC
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From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2018 12:06:45 -0400
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extension draft
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> On Apr 26, 2018, at 11:41 AM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote: > > This discussion would probably be a lot more productive if you were > able to have it without accusing other participants of acting in bad > faith. [ Well the objections do seem rather hypothetical, and the thing being objected to (a 16-bit reserved field) so minimally objectionable, that it is perplexing why it is so important to avoid reaching a compromise by allowing the 2-byte to be added. Indeed it sure looks like the separate document that might define the follow-on extension would be strongly opposed in any form by those opposing the reserved 2 bytes, but I'd be thrilled to learn of your support in principle for such a document, perhaps you'd even be willing to author (or co-author) the initial draft? ] I rather like Paul's point that the lifetime of support for this extension belongs with this extension. Adding an extension to signal ongoing support for another extension rather unnatural. -- Viktor.
- [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extension d… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Melinda Shore
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Willem Toorop
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Willem Toorop
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Joseph Salowey
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Richard Barnes
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Paul Wouters
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Richard Barnes
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Eric Rescorla
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Viktor Dukhovni
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Nico Williams
- Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extensi… Viktor Dukhovni