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I also don't like the AUTH48 changes -- there's no protocol-level reason
to weaken the MUST, since a server that can't handle the extra
state/processing can just not implement the extension at all.

-Ben

On 07/11/2016 10:34 AM, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> I agree with Watson's assessment here. This seems like the wrong
> design choice.
>
> I'm not familiar with OpenSSL's cert selection, but I don't believe
> that the issue
> that this change is intended to address applies to NSS, for two reasons:
>
> 1. NSS does cert selection during client hello processing [0].
> http://searchfox.org/mozilla-central/source/security/nss/lib/ssl/ssl3con.c#9569
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__searchfox.org_mozilla-2Dcentral_source_security_nss_lib_ssl_ssl3con.c-239569&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=pVTD_MCGmQI6J5R-ox-R0Wei-_tcv80ZWTMx-e6oZfU&s=GGUhUgPsmo8P-zHms3do7kMl919w4Emye3THqWUMSgY&e=>
>
> 2. Unless I misunderstand the design of cached-info, all the server needs
> to have is the digest of the serialized chain and it could store that
> at the time
> that it configures the cert (or first uses it). This seems like quite
> a small burden.
>
> I believe the prior design was superior.
>
> -Ekr
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 8:07 AM, Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com
> <mailto:watsonbladd@gmail.com>> wrote:
>
>     On Mon, Jul 11, 2016 at 7:27 AM, Sean Turner <sean@sn3rd.com
>     <mailto:sean@sn3rd.com>> wrote:
>     > Hi,
>     >
>     > Just wanted to remind everybody that we’ve got two non-TLS1.3
>     items we’re looking for WG input on:
>     >
>     > - Before 12 July, we’d like to know your thoughts about
>     progressing draft-ietf-tls-pwd (Watson and ekr responded):
>     >
>     https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/WrNa7PXTZn2ZhfmoQDA_pnUVuN4
>     <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mailarchive.ietf.org_arch_msg_tls_WrNa7PXTZn2ZhfmoQDA-5FpnUVuN4&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=pVTD_MCGmQI6J5R-ox-R0Wei-_tcv80ZWTMx-e6oZfU&s=ZzDtgI_TBc-Nia0FuETErOUeRUXahxu7BclcP8UXy7Q&e=>
>     >
>     > - Before 14 July, we’d like to know your thoughts on the
>     proposed AUTH48 proposed changes (nobody has commented on this):
>     >
>     https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/tls/aBvqMG7t8qkO5rPt-xaMHipuBVk
>     <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__mailarchive.ietf.org_arch_msg_tls_aBvqMG7t8qkO5rPt-2DxaMHipuBVk&d=DQMFaQ&c=96ZbZZcaMF4w0F4jpN6LZg&r=sssDLkeEEBWNIXmTsdpw8TZ3tAJx-Job4p1unc7rOhM&m=pVTD_MCGmQI6J5R-ox-R0Wei-_tcv80ZWTMx-e6oZfU&s=iGwvQ3uwrEzZ6N9yAb5yY5May3Sl2t1r2wy_HvSAhcg&e=>
>
>     I don't like the AUTH48 changes. I understand the need for changing to
>     MAY, but the proposed method of distinguishing offends my
>     sensibilities. Overloading the length field is just ugly.
>
>     >
>     > spt
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>
>
>
>     --
>     "Man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains".
>     --Rousseau.
>
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Re: [TLS] Reminders