Re: [TLS] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC

"Carl Wallace" <CWallace@cygnacom.com> Tue, 05 October 2010 17:00 UTC

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Thread-Topic: [pkix] [TLS] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC
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From: "Carl Wallace" <CWallace@cygnacom.com>
To: =?iso-8859-2?B?T25k+GVqIFN1cv0=?= <ondrej.sury@nic.cz>, "Kemp, David P." <DPKemp@missi.ncsc.mil>
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Cc: pkix@ietf.org, dnsop@ietf.org, saag@ietf.org, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC
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> You are working on wrong assumptions. The DV certs are exactly as
> strong as your DNS is. You only need to attack DNS to issue a DV cert.
> 
> Ondrej Sury

Certificate issuance is not the end of the game.  Clients have opportunity to avoid being fooled by a DV certificate if they choose.  Why disarm the client?