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Re: [TLS] about the PWD Proposal

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Mon, 12 December 2011 21:04 UTC

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Date: Mon, 12 Dec 2011 15:04:44 -0600
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From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org>
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Cc: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>, tls@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [TLS] about the PWD Proposal
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On Mon, Dec 12, 2011 at 2:52 PM, Dan Harkins <dharkins@lounge.org> wrote:
>  It's futile to throw more iterations at this problem. The solution is
> using a protocol based on a zero knowledge proof-- like the protocol in
> question-- an get away from broken things like Wifi-Protected Access,
> or any of the TLS-PSK ciphersuites, using passwords. If an adversary gets
> access to a database of passwords then the contents of that database
> should be assumed to be compromised even if they're salted and even if
> they've been PBKDF2'd with 10,000 iterations.

PBKDF and salting buys the compromised service and its users time to
change all their passwords.  I think this is critical from an
operations point of view.

Nico
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