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Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extension draft

Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com> Thu, 26 April 2018 16:01 UTC

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Date: Thu, 26 Apr 2018 10:53:49 -0500
From: Nico Williams <nico@cryptonector.com>
To: TLS WG <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Proposed text for dnsssec chain extension draft
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On Thu, Apr 26, 2018 at 11:53:29AM -0400, Viktor Dukhovni wrote:
> Of course given evermore sophisticated BGP attacks:
> 
>   https://blog.cloudflare.com/bgp-leaks-and-crypto-currencies/
> 
> you might actually want to consider DNSSEC, implement it properly
> and monitor, and the bricking won't happen.

Good point!

DNSSEC is the only defense against such attacks at this point.

Pinning this extension sure seems like a desirable thing in that
context!

We're not asking for pinning _now_ because as the WG chair says there is
no consensus to add pinning _now_.  We're only trying to make it
*easier* to add it _later_.

Nico
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