Re: [TLS] SCSV vs RI when both specified. Was: Updated draft

Marsh Ray <> Mon, 21 December 2009 16:28 UTC

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Date: Mon, 21 Dec 2009 10:28:29 -0600
From: Marsh Ray <>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] SCSV vs RI when both specified. Was: Updated draft
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Blumenthal, Uri - 0662 - MITLL wrote:
> The only purpose of any protocol is to allow entities to communicate
> (under a given set of constraints). Thus every effort SHOULD be
> invested to provide this capability whenever possible.

TLS is a cryptographic data security protocol.

"Allowing entities to communicate" takes a back seat to the primary goal
of preventing unauthorized communication.

> If the
> protocol spec demands aborting connection, it better have a damn good
> reason to do so - and more substantive than "some Steve decided it
> doesn't really matter to him if the peers connect or not".

How about "remote endpoint doesn't pass the bozo test"?

> Personal curiosity - what kind of work do you do? (Feel free to
> answer in a private email or to ignore altogether.)

I do software development (and security research) work on PhoneFactor, a
product/service for doing two-factor authentication with ordinary phones.

> I'm shocked that nobody else seems to pick on this. Is it that
> mid-weekend thing, or am I the only one who cares whether the peer
> would establish or refuse connection?!

Yes, I care greatly that the peer refuses any connection that looks the
least bit funny.

- Marsh