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Re: [TLS] cryptanalysis vs. encrypted parts of the TLS handshake [was: Re: Simplifying the proof]

Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> Thu, 18 September 2014 14:24 UTC

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From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
To: Michael Sweet <msweet@apple.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Sep 2014 16:24:24 +0200
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Subject: Re: [TLS] cryptanalysis vs. encrypted parts of the TLS handshake [was: Re: Simplifying the proof]
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On Thu, 2014-09-18 at 07:29 -0400, Michael Sweet wrote:
> My $0.02: Would it make sense to stop treating extensions as an a la
> carte mechanism, and instead define "extension suites", much as TLS
> already groups specific combinations of cryptographic primitives that
> can be selected in cipher suites?

Well, I think we need more than your 2 cents for that. Could you
elaborate what you mean here? The extensions were put in place to
overcome the limitation of the ciphersuites that you just mentioned.

> Seems like that would limit the allowed combinations of extensions to
> those that have gone through the necessary analysis and are considered
> "safe" to use together?

Isn't that the set of all extensions that are published by this working
group?

regards,
Nikos

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