Re: [TLS] (offline note) Re: Confirming Consensus on supporting only AEAD ciphers

[[e-mail] (Martin Rex)]

I can not correlate your most recent response to the prior question:

>Michael StJohns wrote:
>>
>> Sorry - I'm coming late here.  Does this also imply the complete 
>> elimination of the integrity only cipher suites?

I understand this to refer to these cipher suites:
    CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_MD5                  = { 0x00,0x01 };
    CipherSuite TLS_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA                  = { 0x00,0x02 };

which provide authentication PLUS integrity, but no confidentiality.

Rene Struik wrote:
> 
> In general, an AEAD mode takes as input two strings a and m and a key k, 
> and authenticates a and m, while encrypting m. If m is the empty string, 
> this results in an authentication-only mode.
> 
> Thus, AEAD modes can be used to provide suitable combinations of 
> authentication and/or encryption. Examples hereof include the GCM mode 
> and CCM mode.

Now this seems to refer to an idea to provide only (initial) authentication,
but no integrity protection of the actual application data (m).


-Martin