Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt

Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com> Mon, 09 July 2018 18:50 UTC

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From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jul 2018 22:50:06 +0400
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To: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Cc: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Fwd: New Version Notification for draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
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On Mon, Jul 9, 2018 at 8:54 PM, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com> wrote:
> Thanks for writing this.
>
> I would be in favor of deprecating old versions of TLS prior to 1.2. Firefox
> Telemetry shows that about 1% of our connections are TLS 1.1 (on the same
> data set, TLS 1.3 is > 5%), and TLS 1.1 is negligible.
>
> This is probably a higher number than we'd be comfortable turning off
> immediately, but it is probably worth starting the process.
>

I'm also in favour. Many banks/instituion in developing countries are
moving to deprecate tls v1.0 and tls v1.1.

As I commented on github:
SSLpulse shows how many top websites support tls 1.2 (92.8%) and this
number is increasing (0.5%):

https://www.ssllabs.com/ssl-pulse/

KeyCDN and digicert have also announced their intentions to deprecate
tls 1.0 and tls 1.1.

https://github.com/sftcd/tls-oldversions-diediedie/commit/a0d6c160d922bd7f52a917884823114c90932291



> -Ekr
>
>
> On Mon, Jul 9, 2018 at 9:40 AM, Kathleen Moriarty
> <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hello,
>>
>> Stephen and I posted the draft below to see if the TLS working group
>> is ready to take steps to deprecate TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.  There has
>> been a recent drop off in usage for web applications due to the PCI
>> Council recommendation to move off TLSv1.0, with a recommendation to
>> go to TLSv1.2 by June 30th.  NIST has also been recommending TLSv1.2
>> as a baseline.  Applications other than those using HTTP may not have
>> had the same reduction in usage.  If you are responsible for services
>> where you have a reasonable vantage point to gather and share
>> statistics to assess usage further, that could be helpful for the
>> discussion.  We've received some feedback that has been incorporated
>> into the working draft and feelers in general have been positive.  It
>> would be good to know if there are any show stoppers that have not
>> been considered.
>>
>> https://github.com/sftcd/tls-oldversions-diediedie
>>
>> Thanks in advance,
>> Kathleen
>>
>>
>> ---------- Forwarded message ----------
>> From:  <internet-drafts@ietf.org>
>> Date: Mon, Jun 18, 2018 at 3:05 PM
>> Subject: New Version Notification for
>> draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
>> To: Stephen Farrell <stephen.farrell@cs.tcd.ie>ie>, Kathleen Moriarty
>> <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
>>
>>
>>
>> A new version of I-D, draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
>> has been successfully submitted by Stephen Farrell and posted to the
>> IETF repository.
>>
>> Name:           draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie
>> Revision:       00
>> Title:          Deprecating TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1
>> Document date:  2018-06-18
>> Group:          Individual Submission
>> Pages:          10
>> URL:
>>
>> https://www.ietf..org/internet-drafts/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00.txt
>>
>> Status:
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie/
>> Htmlized:
>> https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie-00
>> Htmlized:
>>
>> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-moriarty-tls-oldversions-diediedie
>>
>>
>> Abstract:
>>    This document [if approved] formally deprecates Transport Layer
>>    Security (TLS) versions 1.0 [RFC2246] and 1.1 [RFC4346] and moves
>>    these documents to the historic state.  These versions lack support
>>    for current and recommended cipher suites, and various government and
>>    industry profiiles of applications using TLS now mandate avoiding
>>    these old TLS versions.  TLSv1.2 has been the recommended version for
>>    IETF protocols since 2008, providing sufficient time to transition
>>    away from older versions.  Products having to support older versions
>>    increase the attack surface unnecessarily and increase opportunities
>>    for misconfigurations.  Supporting these older versions also requires
>>    additional effort for library and product maintenance.
>>
>>    This document updates the backward compatibility sections of TLS RFCs
>>    [[list TBD]] to prohibit fallback to TLSv1.0 and TLSv1.1.  This
>>    document also updates RFC 7525.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of
>> submission
>> until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org.
>>
>> The IETF Secretariat
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>>
>> Best regards,
>> Kathleen
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
>
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