Re: [TLS] Update on TLS 1.3 Middlebox Issues

Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> Sat, 07 October 2017 15:35 UTC

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Subject: Re: [TLS] Update on TLS 1.3 Middlebox Issues
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Hi,

On Fri, 6 Oct 2017 13:16:37 -0700
Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>; wrote:

> - Fall back to TLS 1.2 (as we have unfortunately done for previous
> releases)

Thinking about this I honestly hope nobody is considering this
seriously. This would be an unfixable security design flaw. And it also
quite significantly differs from previous fallbacks.

There were workarounds in the past for version intolerance by using
SCSV and early versions of 1.3 used some trick with the server random
value. However that was for nonconformant servers that allowed
conformant servers and clients to prevent downgrade attacks.

Such workarounds won't work if we talk about middleboxes, because
what's proposed here is to fallback to TLS 1.2 even if both the server
and the client speak TLS 1.3.

In other words: It's a proposal to make all security advantages of TLS
1.3 irrelevant, as we have a universal downgrade to 1.2.

Given that this would also mean there's no visible incentive to fix
things it would very likely mean keeping this broken workaround for
many years to come.

-- 
Hanno Böck
https://hboeck.de/

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