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Re: [TLS] Early code point assignment for draft-ietf-tls-curve25519-01

Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com> Mon, 11 January 2016 08:12 UTC

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Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 00:12:47 -0800
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From: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
To: Ilari Liusvaara <ilariliusvaara@welho.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Early code point assignment for draft-ietf-tls-curve25519-01
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On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 12:03 AM, Ilari Liusvaara
<ilariliusvaara@welho.com> wrote:
> On Mon, Jan 11, 2016 at 09:28:57AM +0200, Ilari Liusvaara wrote:
>> On Sun, Jan 10, 2016 at 07:53:08PM -0800, Joseph Salowey wrote:
>> > Please respond if you have concern about early code point assignment for
>> > the curves listed in draft-ietf-tls-curve25519-01
>> > <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-curve25519-01>.
>>
>> Wasn't that document effectively merged to RFC4492bis?
>>
>> Also, one contention point in recent thread has seemed how to deal
>> with THS.
>
> And as terms of my current position on this:
>
> I don't think this is signficant. If you want protection from THS that
> actually works, you require EMS anyway (or ensure THS is of no
> consequence at application layer), not try to do TLS configuration
> "workarounds" (that don't actually work).

Are you saying that a Suite B only deployment of TLS which does point
validation is THS vulnerable? I also don't see what attack on
SHA512(A|B|DH(A,B)) needs extra assumptions to be prevented.

>
>
> -Ilari
>
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