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Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator

Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com> Wed, 09 May 2018 07:39 UTC

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References: <4E347898-C787-468C-8514-30564D059378@sn3rd.com> <96B30D45-BAA9-4798-B222-F7890157A434@nerd.ninja> <20180504214834.GS5742@akamai.com> <50E87E1B-A2DE-4E0A-B851-B83D2AA9320D@nerd.ninja> <CABcZeBPp_ibhmKJfLvqGMJj4sz6u4bC1-2ncJZ3zbGVCyEHCPw@mail.gmail.com> <EFDFA96E-ED01-42AC-BA8A-7844974FDFF9@nerd.ninja> <726B4BF1-79AA-494E-9852-DC3682E80E3A@nerd.ninja> <CABkgnnWmGYZ8V1a0TJs3eCcDA=sxgyCT0MPUfQdLOR-jVf1kfg@mail.gmail.com> <B62611A2-D9F0-4752-AA90-46974EA47517@nerd.ninja>
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From: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 09 May 2018 07:39:07 +0000
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To: r@nerd.ninja
Cc: "<tls@ietf.org>" <tls@ietf.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] WGLC for draft-ietf-tls-exported-authenticator
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This isn't really a security consideration though, it's a truism.  A MitM
can break things that depend on end-to-end integrity of the connection.
On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 11:25 AM Roelof duToit <r@nerd.ninja> wrote:

> If the use of the mechanism is not negotiated on the TLS level then I
would appreciate it if the “Security Considerations” section of the draft
could be amended to include a paragraph that warns potential implementors
that protocol-agnostic middleboxes will break the mechanism without any
clear failure indicators.

> > On May 8, 2018, at 8:13 PM, Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, May 9, 2018 at 2:20 AM Roelof duToit <r@nerd.ninja> wrote:
> >
> >> I understand that there is not really anything to negotiate per se, but
> > would it not be prudent to add a TLS extension to negotiate support for
> > exported-authenticator in the TLS layer prior to using it in the
> > application layer?
> >
> > We don't signal the potential need for exporters.  I see no reason to
> > signal this either.  Any signaling necessary really belongs at the
higher
> > layer.

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