Re: [TLS] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC

Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com> Mon, 18 October 2010 18:27 UTC

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From: Martin Rex <mrex@sap.com>
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To: Bruno.Harbulot@manchester.ac.uk (Bruno Harbulot)
Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2010 20:28:55 +0200 (MEST)
In-Reply-To: <4CBC8924.7080001@manchester.ac.uk> from "Bruno Harbulot" at Oct 18, 10 06:51:32 pm
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Subject: Re: [TLS] [pkix] Cert Enumeration and Key Assurance With DNSSEC
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EV vs. DV is primarily about "risk management", based on the
flawed assumption that "green-bar" vs. blue-bar/white-bar 
would affect user behaviour.

Look at the real world:
signin.ebay.<country> uses an EV-Cert, probably because ebay may
have to pay for damages if someone steals user account credentials
and abuses them.

payments.ebay.<country> uses a DV-Cert, because the user bears all
risks from his payment data getting leaked.


-Martin



Bruno Harbulot wrote:
> 
> On 04/10/10 21:04, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> >
> > For the past five years, CA certificates have been divided into Domain
> > Validated and Extended Validated. As some of you know, I instigated the
> > process that led to the creation of EV certs because I was very worried
> > about the low quality of many DV certificates.
> >
> > Some DV certificates are of very low quality. Which is why I would like
> > to see the padlock icon phased out entirely. Why does the user need to
> > know if encryption is being used at all?
> 
> I'm still not convinced about the greatness of EV certificates.
> 
> Why should an organization that wants to deploy its own PKI have to 
> depend on one of the big players who've managed to get their signature 
> hard-coded into browsers?
> 
> How beneficial are EV certs for the end-users? Green-bar secure v.s. 
> Blue-bar insecure (or less secure) really is a confusing 
> over-simplification.
> 
> A DV certs bind a cert to a domain, whereas an EV cert bind a cert to a 
> company name. However, some companies use domain names that have nothing 
> to do with their company name, and which could look like competitors 
> instead: http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg06528.html