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Re: [TLS] Sending fatal alerts over TCP

Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com> Wed, 21 December 2011 20:04 UTC

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Date: Wed, 21 Dec 2011 14:04:02 -0600
From: Marsh Ray <marsh@extendedsubset.com>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Sending fatal alerts over TCP
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On 12/21/2011 01:39 PM, Martin Rex wrote:
>
> In case that you're referring to  page 70,
> this text appears in a section
>
>    "second check the RST bit,"
>
> and can only be ever reached when it was
> not fully processed by the previous "first check sequence number"
> a page before, which says:
> *>       If an incoming segment is not acceptable, an acknowledgment
> *>       should be sent in reply (unless the RST bit is set, if so [...]

But let's say the RST segment passes the sequence number check.

It seems that this language applies:
> Initial tests on arrival  are used to discard old duplicates,
>   but further processing is  done in SEG.SEQ order.
         ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

So maybe I am starting to agree with you (but for a different reason :-)

- Marsh

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