Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cipher suites (was: Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA should die)

Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org> Mon, 13 April 2015 17:41 UTC

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Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2015 17:41:37 +0000
From: Viktor Dukhovni <ietf-dane@dukhovni.org>
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Subject: Re: [TLS] Negotiate only symmetric cipher via cipher suites (was: Ala Carte Cipher suites - was: DSA should die)
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On Mon, Apr 13, 2015 at 01:31:12PM -0400, Daniel Kahn Gillmor wrote:

> Once the full cartesian explosion is available by multidimensional
> enumeration, we have to mark out which corners of the space are actually
> bad ideas, and we have to make sure our implementations don't stumble
> into those corners by accident.

Is this actually a problem?  Is it worse than the current multitude
of suites (with some gaps yet to be filled)?

-- 
	Viktor.