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Re: [TLS] Another IRINA bug in TLS

Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org> Thu, 21 May 2015 13:27 UTC

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Date: Thu, 21 May 2015 15:27:38 +0200
From: Aaron Zauner <azet@azet.org>
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To: Santiago Zanella-Beguelin <santiago@microsoft.com>
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Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, "tls@ietf.org" <tls@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [TLS] Another IRINA bug in TLS
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Hi,

Santiago Zanella-Beguelin wrote:
>> Well, you assume that the so-called "safe primes" are universally
>> used, which is not really the case. Expecting all servers sending
>> these parameters wouldn't really work.
> 
> Yes, non-safe primes should be first deprecated.
> 

I'm curious: what are instances where unsafe primes are still used,
generated and distributed for use in TLS? Hence where do we need to
deprecate?

Thanks,
Aaron

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