RE: [TLS] OTP-TLS I-D [Was: FW: I-D ACTION:draft-linn-otp-tls-00.txt]

Since the document quite significantly changes how the PSK
ciphersuites work (identity field is re-used to carry a number of
other attributes; new alert messages are added; key-exchange related
information is carried in new TLS extensions; etc.), I think it would
be better to treat OTP as a new TLS key exchange algorithm (and define
new ciphersuites like TLS_OTP_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SA). As it's currently
written, this document certainly is not a "profile" of RFC 4279
in any usual sense of the word...

Couple of additional comments:

- See RFC 3979 section 11: "No IPR Disclosures in IETF Documents"

- Text about "hardening" should give concrete advice on how secure
OTP-TLS actuallly is, given some realistic parameter values (just
talking about "economically unattractive" is very vague).

Best regards,
Pasi 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: ext Linn, John [mailto:jlinn@rsasecurity.com] 
> Sent: 14 June, 2006 14:17
> To: tls@ietf.org
> Cc: Nyström, Magnus
> Subject: [TLS] OTP-TLS I-D [Was: FW: I-D 
> ACTION:draft-linn-otp-tls-00.txt]
> 
> This recent I-D constitutes a profile layered on TLS-PSK, 
> intended to authenticate TLS connections with the general 
> class of One-Time Password (OTP) methods.  We'd like to 
> invite review and comment in the TLS WG.   
> 
> --jl

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