Subject: Re: [TLS] SNI and tickets and resumption
From: Viktor Dukhovni <[email-masked]>
To: [email-masked]
Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2014 20:11:49 +0000
List-Id: "This is the mailing list for the Transport Layer Security working group of the IETF." <tls.ietf.org>

On Mon, Aug 11, 2014 at 08:31:59PM +0200, Martin Rex wrote:

> Normally, I would assume that the client-side session cache is organized/
> indexed by the information that is used for server endpoint identification,
> and a client should not be proposing session resumption of a cached session
> that would fail server endpoint identification.

Exactly!  This is, for example, how the Postfix client session
cache is keyed.  With DANE, the session lookup key even covers the
current peer TLSA RRset, so that when TLSA RRs change, the client
negotiates a new session.  If the client proposes a session with
an SNI name it would not accept for the certificate chain of the
cached session, that's the client's fault.

-- 
	Viktor.